12/29/2023 0 Comments Matilde bombardini![]() These patterns, taken together, suggest that corporations strategically deploy charitable grants to induce non-pro fit grantees to make comments that favor their benefactors, and that this translates into regulatory discussion that is closer to the firm's own comments. Third, when a firm comments on a new rule, the discussion of the final rule is more similar to the firm's comments when the firm's recent grantees also comment on that rule. This content similarity does not result from similarly-worded comments that express divergent sentiment. Second, when a firm comments on a rule, the comments by non-profits that recently received grants from the firm's foundation are systematically closer in content similarity to the firm's own comments than to those submitted by other non-profits commenting on that rule. First, we show that, shortly after a firm donates to a non-profit, the grantee is more likely to comment on rules for which the firm has also provided a comment. ![]() Bombardini, Matilde & Trebbi, Francesco, 2011. 'Votes or Money Theory and Evidence from the US Congress,' NBER Working Papers 13672, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. We document three patterns in a comprehensive sample of public commentary made by firms and non-profits within U.S. Matilde Bombardini & Francesco Trebbi, 2007. corporations, which list all grants awarded to non-pro fits. Economist Matilde Bombardini’s research covers various aspects of international trade and political economy. Matilde BOMBARDINI Cited by 713 of University of British Columbia - Vancouver, Vancouver (UBC) Read 24 publications Contact Matilde BOMBARDINI. We identify these ties using IRS forms submitted by the charitable arms of large U.S. Policymakers (and the public at large), however, may be unaware of the financial ties between some firms and non-profits - ties that are legal and tax-exempt, but difficult to trace. For-profit corporations and non-pro t entities are active in this process and are arguably expected to provide independent viewpoints. University of British Columbia (UBC) ( email) 2329 West Mall Vancouver, British Columbia BC V6T 1Z4 Canada. Politicians and regulators rely on feedback from the public when setting policies. Transportation Economics in the 21st Century.Training Program in Aging and Health Economics.The Roybal Center for Behavior Change in Health.Retirement and Disability Research Center.Measuring the Clinical and Economic Outcomes Associated with Delivery Systems.Improving Health Outcomes for an Aging Population.The Political Economy Consequences of Chinas Export. Early Indicators of Later Work Levels, Disease and Death (With Matilde Bombardini and Francesco Trebbi), American Economic Review, Conditionally Accepted.Conference on Research in Income and Wealth.Boosting Grant Applications from Faculty at MSIs Matilde Bombardini Haas School of Business University of California, Berkeley Investing in Influence: Investors, Portfolio Firms and Political Giving.Productivity, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship.International Finance and Macroeconomics.Information and Obstruction in the Notice and Comment Process for U.S. (with Giuseppe Carenini, Francesco Trebbi, and Linzi Xing) Measuring Special Interest Group Influence on Regulations and Administrative Rulemaking (with Linzi Xing, Giuseppe Carenini, and Francesco Trebbi) Presented at AACL-IJCNLP 2020 In Progress Improving Context Modeling in Neural Topic Segmentation Third, the final rule’s discussion by a regulator is more similar to the firm’s comments on that rule when the firm’s recent grantees also commented on it. Second, when a firm comments on a rule, the comments by non-profits that recently received grants from the firm’s foundation are systematically closer in content to the firm’s own comments, relative to comments submitted by other non-profits. First, we show that, shortly after a firm donates to a non-profit, that non-profit is more likely to comment on rules on which the firm has also commented. We document three patterns which suggest that these grants may distort policy. Policymakers, however, may not be fully aware of the financial ties between some firms and non-profits – grants that are legal and tax-exempt, but hard to trace. Although being a researcher is not always an easy job, Matilde loves challenging questions and the continuous process of inquiry within the academia environment. For-profit corporations and non-profit entities are active in the rule-making process and are arguably expected to provide independent viewpoints. federal regulatory rule-making for 2003-2016. We show how this logic of virtuous competition can break down, using a new and comprehensive dataset on U.S. (With Marianne Bertrand, Matilde Bombardini, Raymond Fisman, and Francesco Trebbi) Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 2021, 136(4): pp.2413-2465.Ībstract: Information is central to designing effective policy, and policymakers often rely on competing interests to separate useful from biased information. Hall of Mirrors: Corporate Philanthropy and Strategic Advocacy
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